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(Start to) Look Out Below!: Creating a Court to
Review
Targeted Attacks on United States Citizens
Daniel Bower*
Introduction
"Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But
it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values
that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American
citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments
that our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested;
and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at
home to the principles for which we fight abroad."1
On March 22, 2013, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.
wrote a letter to the members of Congress acknowledging that four
American citizens have been killed through the use of targeted
killing procedures since the War on Terror began.2 The legality of
the targeting killing procedures used by the United States has
* Daniel Bower earned his Juris Doctor and Certificates in Labor &
Employment Law and International & Comparative Law from
the Chicago-Kent College of Law. He also graduated from Ohio
University with a Bachelor of Business Administration, cum laude,
in Finance and Business Economics with a minor in Political
Science.
1
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004).
2
N.Y. TIMES, Holder Letter on Counterterror Strikes Against U.S.
Citizens, May 22, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/23/us/politics/23holderdrone-lettter.html?_r=1&.
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recently come to the forefront of political discussions around the
world. “At the heart of the debate are questions relating to Executive
powers during wartime” and “whether and to what extent the CIA, an
intelligence agency that functions in secret with far less public and
Congressional oversight than the armed forces, should be conducting
operations using lethal force.”3 In addition, concerns have arisen
regarding “the criteria for targeting and killing individuals, including
U.S. citizens, the existence of substantive or procedural safeguards to
ensure accuracy and legitimacy of killings, and the existence of
accountability mechanisms.”4
After acknowledging the existence of a targeted killing
program on numerous occasions, the Obama administration received
increased pressure from members of Congress to explain its stance
and legal rationale behind its decision to target and kill American
citizens. 5 “Targeted killing” refers to premeditated acts of lethal
force employed by states to kill specific individuals who are not in
custody, and often, difficult to get into custody. 6 Drone-based
targeting killing, which is a common way to conduct these
operations, “refers to the use of ‘drones,’ or unmanned aerial
vehicles that are remotely piloted or run autonomously, to remotely
launch missile strikes for targeted killing.”7
This article will not focus on the legality of targeted killings
in either domestic or international law. That is an entirely separate
3

Brief for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism et. al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 4, Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
Central Intelligence Agency, No. 11-5320 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 2012),
2012 WL 978169 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
4
Id. at 5-6.
5
Michael D. Shear and Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo Backing
Drone Attacks on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/us/politics/obama-ordersrelease-of-drone-memos-to-lawmakers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
6
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 3, at 8.
7
Id.

73

CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L.

Vol. XIV

topic. This article assumes that in general, the use of targeted killing
is legal. The focus of this article will be advocating for
implementation of a review process to ensure the legitimacy of
Government-sanctioned targeted killings of specific individuals.
The thesis of this article is that the United States Congress
can and should pass legislation implementing post facto review of
targeted killing decisions in order to create a safeguard against
unquestioned, Government-sanctioned attacks on American citizens.
For purposes of this article, the court that would hear these cases is
titled the “Targeted Attack Review Court” or “TARC”.
This article can be used as a starting point for legislators
wishing to implement a review process for the Government’s
targeted killing program. It will focus on what procedures would
make the TARC most effective and most likely to find support with
members of Congress, defense officials, and U.S. courts.
I. Opponents and Supporters of the TARC
The CIA and other intelligence and defense officials will
likely not support such legislation. Very few people want their
decisions questioned, and that is precisely the aim of the TARC.
However, the creation of a TARC already has potential
support in Congress. Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, head of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, stated that she would consider
proposals to create a court overseeing targeted killing procedures,
analogous to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 8 The
TARC would also likely see support from Senator Rand Paul, who
engaged in a widely publicized filibuster on March 6, 2013

8

Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, Drones Are Focus as C.I.A.
Nominee Goes Before Senators, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/us/politics/senate-panel-willquestion-brennan-on-targeted-killings.html?pagewanted=all.
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concerning the ambiguities of the Obama administration’s drone
policy.9
Other Libertarian Congressman, as well as many Democrats
and Socially Liberal Republicans, would likely support this proposed
legislation as well, especially since favorable public opinion on the
Government’s antiterrorism efforts is quickly diminishing. For the
first time in American history, the People no longer believe that the
Government is properly balancing security and individual rights.10
II. Foundational Material
A. Recent Developments in Targeted Killing Strategy
In February 2013, President Obama acknowledged the existence
of America’s targeted killing program while discussing the death of a
U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki.11 Anwar al-Awlaki was the first U.S.
Citizen to be placed on a list of suspected terrorists that the CIA had
authorized to kill.12 What is even more disconcerting is that President
9

Sadia Ahsanuddin, Rand Paul filibusters the domestic drone, AL
JAZEERA, Mar. 12, 2013,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/20133911444231
4519.html.
10
WASHINGTON POST, Washington Post Poll,
http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_20130418.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2014). In an April 2013 survey of 588 adults, when asked what
worried them more, 41% of people feared the Government would not
go far enough in investigating alleged terrorists, while 48% of people
said they feared the Government would go too far in compromising
Constitutional rights while investigating alleged terrorists.
11
Mazzetti, supra note 8.
12
Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.htm
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Obama approved that decision; the President of the United States
approved the decision to kill a U.S. citizen without his guilt being
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.13
Anwar al-Awlaki was what the Government deemed a radical
cleric, who was killed in a September 30, 2011 drone strike in
Yemen.14
“During his presidential campaign, Republican Rep.
Ron Paul criticized the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki,
saying: ‘Al-Awlaki was born here, he is an American
citizen. He was never tried or charged for any crimes.
No one knows if he killed anybody. ... But if the
American people accept this blindly and casually that
we now have an accepted practice of the president
assassinating people who he thinks are bad guys, I
think it's sad.’”15
However, what really made the story of Anwar al-Awlaki’s
death a headline was that the drone strike ordered just weeks later
caused death of his 16 year-old son: Abdulrahman al-Awlaki.16 A
l; Tom Leonard, Barack Obama orders killing of US cleric Anwar alAwlaki, THE TELEGRAPH, April 7, 2010, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/7564581/BarackObama-orders-killing-of-US-cleric-Anwar-al-Awlaki.html.
13
Shane, supra note 12; Leonard, supra note 12.
14
BBC NEWS, Islamist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki killed in Yemen, Sept.
30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15121879.
15
Andrew Rafferty, American drone deaths highlight controversy,
NBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2013,
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/05/16856963-americandrone-deaths-highlight-controversy?lite.
16
Sabrina Siddiqui, Obama ‘Surprised,’ ‘Upset’ When Anwar AlAwlaki’s Teenage Son Was Killed By U.S. Drone Strike, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, April 24, 2013, http://www.
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strike that a White House official deemed “a mistake, a bad
mistake.”17 Abdulrahman was also an American citizen, and had no
ties to any terrorist organizations.18 His family alleged that he was
targeted simply because he was the son of Anwar al-Awlaki.19
Sources have stated that the Government has many “kill lists”
filled with counterterrorism targets, one of which is maintained by
the CIA.20 The CIA and other agency analysts prepare this “kill
list.”21 CIA lawyers then determine whether or not to place someone
on the “kill list” based on whether or not that person poses a direct
threat to the United States.22 The CIA then gives the final approval
for a strike. 23 The Government conducts strikes on both specific
known individuals, and on unknown targets believed to be terror
suspects.24
What is truly astonishing is that “[b]etween 1,990 and 3,308
people are reported to have been killed in the drone strikes in
Pakistan since 2004, the vast majority of them during the Obama
terms.” 25 Although most Americans like to believe that these

huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/obama-anwar-al-awlakison_n_3141688.html.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 3, at 23; Ken Dilanian, U.S. Put
New Restrictions on CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/
07/world/la-fg-cia-drones-20111108.
21
Brief of Amici Curiae supra note 3, at 24.
22
Id. at 25.
23
Id. at 24.
24
Dilanian, supra note 20.
25
RT NEWS, Leaked report: Nearly half of US drone strikes in
Pakistan not against al-Qaeda, April 12, 2013,
http://rt.com/news/drones-us-al-qaeda-militants-649/.
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operations are focused exclusively on high-level suspects and that
there are no civilian casualties, this is not the case.26
In the 12-month period up to 2011, forty-three out of ninetyfive reported drone strikes were not aimed at al-Qaeda at all.27 While
265 out of 482 people killed during targeted attacks were defined by
the Government as ‘extremists’, only six of the men killed, less than
two percent, were senior al-Qaeda leaders.”28
Some of those killed “appear to have been simply errors, with
the victims branded as terrorists only after the fact.”29 And even
more alarming, is that documents "show that drone operators weren't
always certain who they were killing."30 These shocking statistics are
why the TARC is necessary in today’s War on Terror.
Moreover, while the focus of the TARC is on protecting the
lives of U.S. citizens, the TARC’s deterrence goals relating to
“shooting before aiming” may save the lives of a number of
individuals who are not U.S. citizens. Thus, the protection of
potentially innocent U.S. lives may have a spillover effect that
protects citizens of nations in which the Government conducts
targeted attacks.

26

Conor Friedersdorf, New Evidence That Team Obama Misled Us
About the Drones, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 10, 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/new-evidencethat-team-obama-misled-us-about-the-drone-war/274839/ (stating
that a review of classified documents demonstrates that “al-Qaeda
members were a minority of people killed by drones, and killing
senior al-Qaeda leaders was rare.”).
27
RT NEWS, supra note 25.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Friedersdorf, supra note 26.
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B. The Implications of the DOJ White Paper
On February 4, 2013, NBC News released a Department of
Justice White Paper, titled: “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation
Directed Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader
of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force.”31 The document explains the
legal basis for the Government’s targeted killing program.32 “The
memo was given confidentially to members of the Senate
Intelligence and Judiciary committees by the administration last
June,” according to a statement released by Sen. Dianne Feinstein.33
It is important to keep in mind that the memo is a policy paper, not
an official legal document.34 The assertion being made in the White
Paper is that the:
“United States would be able to use lethal force
against a U.S. citizen, who is located outside the
United States and is an operational leader continually
planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in
at least the following circumstances: (1) where an
informed, high-level official of the U.S. government
has determined that the targeted individual poses an
imminent threat of violent attack against the United
States; (2) where a capture operation would be
infeasible and where those conducting the operation
31

Michael Isikoff, Justice Department memo reveals legal case for
drone strikes on Americans, NBC NEWS, Feb. 4, 2013,
http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-onamericans?lite.
32
Id.
33
Pam Benson, Memo backs U.S. using lethal force against
Americans overseas, CNN, Feb. 6 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/05/us/lethal-force-memo/index.html.
34
Id.
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continue to monitor whether capture becomes
feasible; and (3) where such an operation would be
conducted consistent with applicable law of war
principles.”35
Moreover, the framework discussed in the DOJ White Paper
is remarkably similar to President Obama’s stance on the issue.
“The administration has said that strikes by the CIA's
missile-firing Predator and Reaper drones are
authorized only against ‘specific senior operational
leaders of al Qaida and associated forces’ involved in
the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks who are plotting
‘imminent’ violent attacks on Americans. ‘It has to be
a threat that is serious and not speculative,’ President
Barack Obama said in a Sept. 6, 2012, interview with
CNN. ‘It has to be a situation in which we can't
capture the individual before they move forward on
some sort of operational plot against the United
States.’”36
The other important aspect of the White Paper is the legal
foundation discussed in the 16-page memo.37 First, the memo states
that: “in defined circumstances, a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen
who has joined al-Qa’ida or its associated forces would be lawful
under U.S. and international law.”38 Second, the memo disclaims any
liability for a targeted killing pursuant to either Title 18 or the
assassination ban.39 Third, “[w]ere the target of a lethal operation a
U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clause and
35

Isikoff, supra note 31, at 6 of the White Paper.
Friedersdorf, supra note 26.
37
Isikoff, supra note 31, at 1-2 of the White Paper.
38
Id. at 1 of the White Paper.
39
Id.
36
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the Fourth Amendment, that individual’s citizenship would not
immunize him from a lethal operation.”40
Again, the purpose of this article is not to debate the legality
of targeting a U.S. citizen. The reference to the DOJ White Paper is
simply to add further foundation to the relevance of the topic at
issue, especially since the Obama administration has taken a
remarkably similar stance. Assuming it is true that it is legal to target
and kill a U.S. citizen engaged with a terrorist organization in an
attempt to attack the United States, then there must be some sort of
review of the decision to target those individuals.
C. The Legality of Targeted Killing Under International Law
As stated above, this article is not meant to analyze the
legality of targeting killing. The purpose of this article is strictly to
focus on what can be done to minimize the loss of innocent lives,
given that the procedure exists. Regardless, a brief examination of
the legality of targeted attacks under international law is relevant for
foundational purposes.
Pursuant to the Geneva Conventions Common Article 2
international armed conflicts, both lawful and unlawful combatants
may be targeted.41 And, under Common Article 3 non-international
armed conflicts, individuals may be targeted if they are positively
identified armed individuals taking active part in hostilities. 42
However, Additional Protocol I, Article 51.3, which is generally
considered customary international law, appears to prohibit targeted
40

Id. at 2 of the White Paper (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 532 (2004)).
41
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention),
art. 2, Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
42
Id. at art. 3.
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killing in international armed conflicts until a civilian takes direct
part in hostilities.43
It is evident that the issue of the legality of targeted killing
procedures is yet to be resolved. What is important to remember is
that for the purpose of this article, the use of targeted killings in
general is presumed to be legal, but each individual attack may not
be legal.
III. Comparison To Similar Foreign Legislation
Other States already support similar legislation:
“[The Israeli Supreme Court] has developed limits on
targeted killing through a mix of IHL and human
rights law. These limits include: (1) independent, ex
post investigation by executive authorities ‘regarding
the precision of the identification of the target and the
circumstances of the attack,’ and, even more
remarkable from a U.S. perspective; (2) independent
judicial review of those executive investigations.”44

43

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), art. 51.3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. However, the
United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, so it is not
bound by its terms.
44
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Measure Twice, Shoot
Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, U. ILL. L. REV. 1201,
1233 (2011) (citing HCJ 769/02, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr.
v. Gov't of Isr. (PCATI) [Dec. 11, 2005], slip op. [hereinafter
PCATI], which at paragraph 40 requires objective, ex post executive
review, and at paragraph 54 requires judicial review of ex post
executive review in "appropriate cases").
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The Israeli Supreme Court relied on two European Court of Human
Rights cases in making these determinations.45
The ECHR stated that there should be an official
investigation when individuals have been killed by the State in order
to determine whether deadly force was justified, and if it was not, to
hold those involved responsible.46 The Israel Supreme Court also
recognized that ex post executive review by the judiciary was
necessary in this context, with deference given to military officials
acting in their official capacity.47 Finally, when it comes to who
reviews targeted killing decisions, “[t]he Israelis rely on a mix of
executive and judicial actors.”48
These cases add further support to the feasibility of the
implementation of the TARC. The goals and standards discussed
above are strikingly similar to those of the TARC and will be
discussed at length in the rest of the article.
IV. Comparison to Enacted Domestic Law
A. Comparing the FISC to the TARC
The United States’ creation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) through the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) is comparable to the creation of the TARC.
In enacting FISA in 1978,
“Congress authorized judges of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to approve
45

Id. (citing McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, ¶¶
161-63 (1995) and McKerr v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep.
553, 559 (2001)).
46
Id. at 1234 (citing McCann, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 161).
47
Id. (citing PCATI, supra note 44, at ¶¶ 56-57).
48
Id. at 1236.
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electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes if there is probable cause to believe ‘that the
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power’ and that each of the
specific ‘facilities or places at which the electronic
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be
used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.’”49
After September 11th, President Bush authorized the NSA to
conduct warrantless wiretapping of communications where one party
was located outside the U.S. and a participant was reasonably
believed to be a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
organization. 50 “[T]he FISC issued orders authorizing the
Government to target international communications into or out of the
United States where there was probable cause to believe that one
participant to the communication was a member or agent of al-Qaeda
or an associated terrorist organization.”51
FISC approval is contingent upon the Government showing
that “minimization” procedures are in place.52 This means that the
invasiveness of the inquiry is limited to the relevant parties. This
“minimization” requirement is a key aspect for the TARC to take
into account. Targeted killings should not be used to destroy entire
towns and cities.
There are a few additional key comparisons that can be drawn
between the FISC and the TARC. First, and possibly most
importantly, is that FISA and FISC have continually been held
constitutional. All courts that have considered the issue, both before

49

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, USA, 133 U.S. 1138, 1143 (2013).
Id.
51
Id. at 1144.
52
Id. at 1145.
50
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and after the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, have rejected
constitutional challenges.53
Second, proceedings in the TARC, like the FISC, would be
held in camera.54 In order for the TARC to have a realistic chance of
being supported and implemented, the in camera aspect would likely
be a requirement. National security is always a major concern in this
area of the law. Implementing the in camera requirement respects the
deference given to the Government in the area of national security,
while at the same time implementing accountability for the targeted
killing of a U.S. citizen.
FISA provides the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
with jurisdiction to entertain ex parte executive applications for
electronic surveillance.55 However, the TARC courts would not be ex
parte. In the TARC, neither the plaintiff, nor his or her witnesses,
would be permitted to be present. Witnesses would only be allowed
to provide affidavits advocating for the victim. For national security
reasons, only advocates for the Government, Government witnesses,
and the plaintiffs’ advocates would be permitted to enter the hearing

53

United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 103, 120 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied. The court clarified that only one district court has held
FISA unconstitutional. However, that decision was vacated by the
Ninth Circuit in Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir.
2010); see United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 337 (3rd Cir. 2011)
(“Aligning with all of the other courts of appeals that have
considered this issue, however, we reject defendants’ constitutional
challenge.”). These challenges focus on due process violations and
will be examined in greater depth in the CONCERNS REGARDING
THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS section of this article.
54
50 U.S.C.A. § 1803 (West Supp. 2010).
55
Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 117.
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challenging the Government’s decision. This strikes a fair balance
between adequate representation and national security concerns.56
B. Criticisms of FISA
A major criticism of FISA is that Government officials have a
tendency to abuse the Act in certain high-profile cases.57 Since its
enactment, there have been accusations that FISA protocols were not
properly followed in many cases.58 Moreover, there is evidence that
FISA has been increasingly used to target non-terrorists.59
This is another reason ex ante review may not be the most
appropriate option for the TARC. If the Government requires
permission from the TARC before acting, evidence may be more
likely to be fabricated in order to gain approval to strike. If the
TARC had an ex ante review system similar to FISC, it would allow
the Government to avoid sanctions as long as the Government could
establish that it followed proper procedure; there would be no
substantive analysis. This is not an appropriate measure.
Just because the Government follows a checklist does not
mean that the actions of the Government are reasonable. The
possibility of abuse in this area of the law is too great to not review
the reasonableness of targeted attacks against United States citizens
after they occur. Just as FISA has allowed the Government to violate
the rights of the innocent, so has the Government’s unchecked
decision-making power in the targeted killing of United States

56

“Fair balance” as used here is what a United States court would
likely decide was a fair balance, although human rights advocates
may likely disagree.
57
Christopher P. Banks, Security and Freedom After September 11:
The Institutional Limits and Ethical Costs of Terrorism Prosecutions,
13 PUB. INTEGRITY 5, 15 (2011).
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citizens. This is why the TARC must review the Government’s
decisions post facto.
Another major criticism of FISA is that when the
Government attempts to procure FISA warrants, the process is too
inefficient to be truly effective due to internal legal, bureaucratic, and
procedural problems.60 This is yet another reason ex ante review is
not appropriate for the TARC. In times of war there may be moments
when the Government must act with supreme expediency. Requiring
approval to attack a major threat could seriously threaten the
Government’s ability to defend the Nation. The Government must be
able to act when it deems appropriate, but it must know that targeted
attack decisions may be reviewed. While the decision to attack in the
first place seems like the appropriate place to review this process, it
is not the most realistic.
V. The Implementation of the TARC
Now that a sufficient foundation has been laid, the article will
now discuss the specific policies and procedures related to the
implementation of the Targeted Attack Review Court.
A. The Limited Scope of the TARC’S Authority
The scope of the TARC would be limited. The public policy
implications of such a court are obvious. In many cases, the
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens may directly conflict with the
Government’s need for deference to act as protectors of national
security.
The TARC is meant to act as a deterrent factor to those
officials who have the ability to order targeted killings. As of right
now there are little or no deterrents to ordering targeted attacks.
Because there is no risk of the loss of American soldiers’ lives, and
no risk that officials will be held accountable for their decisions, it is
60

Id.
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much easier to order an attack than what basic human rights demand.
If nothing else, the presence of the TARC is a reason to pause and
ensure that enough evidence has been gathered to order an attack.
Soldiers can be courts-martialled for their decision to pull the trigger
in battle; there is no reason that a Government official’s decision to
push the kill button should not be reviewed as well.
The TARC would not be established in order to force the
Government to obtain permission before it orders an attack on an
individual. The TARC would be solely responsible for hearing
grievances post facto on behalf of those who are targeted by the U.S.
Government. It would be tasked with deciding whether the actions of
those officials who ordered the targeted killing were reasonable in
light of the surrounding circumstances. The TARC would not be
created in order to take power away from the military and
intelligence agencies to conduct the actions they deem essential. The
TARC’s only responsibility would be to determine whether or not
the decision to attack was appropriate at the time the decision was
made. And the liability decision would be strictly based on whether
the decision at the time was reasonable.
Finally, the TARC would only hear cases regarding attacks
on American citizens, whether on United States or foreign soil.
Legally and politically, there are a multitude of obvious problems
and issues that arise when hearing the disputes of non-citizens, the
most crucial being that in most circumstances they would not be
subject to the protections of the United States Constitution.
These limitations have been placed on the TARC in order to
minimize the controversial nature of the proposed legislation. Afterthe-fact review of the targeted killing of citizens is a much easier sell
to the Government and to Congress than requiring approval of every
single targeted attack decision regardless of who is being targeted.
B. Who Judges the Targeted Attack Decisions
The question of who would hear cases in the TARC is a key
issue in this process. Ideally, the TARC would consist of a mix of
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retired intelligence professionals, military personnel, and federal
judges. The goal of this process is that the individuals who sit on the
TARC would have a wealth of experience and as little stake in the
outcome of the case as possible. For this reason, everyone on the
TARC should be retired from the career that qualifies him or her to
hold a position on the TARC. The TARC would consist of a mix of
retired federal court judges, military generals, and professionals from
the CIA, FBI, JSOC, etc. The TARC would have a rotating fivemember review committee. There would always be at least one
member sitting on the TARC from each of the professions listed
above: one judge, one military general, and one defense professional.
These officials would be appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, the same way federal court judges are appointed.61
C. Who Represents the Plaintiff
Another major decision that must be made is who will
represent the plaintiff in the TARC. Again, because of national
security concerns, the plaintiffs and their witnesses will not be
permitted in TARC hearings; only the victims’ advocates will be
permitted in TARC hearings.
Appropriate advocates for the victim are necessary in order
for hearings to be fair. The most logical choice would be a JAG
officer. This will obviously require a lot of cooperation between the
military and government agencies, but JAG officers will be the best
advocates for the victims of targeted attacks. JAG officers are trained
in handling sensitive information. They are aware of the classified
nature of information associated with military tribunals. They risk
dishonorable discharge for disobeying the rules of military justice
and for revealing classified information if assigned to the TARC.
They are attorneys devoted to justice and the rights and freedoms
associated with being a United States citizen.
61

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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More importantly, they are trained to analyze “compliance
with law-of-war rules such as discrimination, proportionality, and
necessity. Judge advocates now sit in targeting centers and provide
real-time advice about the legality of attacking various targets.”62
They have the expertise to represent victims that civilian attorneys do
not possess.
There are individuals who would likely have reservations
about using JAG officers to represent the victims of targeted attacks
for fear of the increasing militarization of the review process.
However, any fear that using JAG officers would cause a conflict of
interest is easily refuted. JAG officers represent both the Government
and its soldiers in military tribunals on a daily basis. If these officers
can defend soldiers against Government actions, it seems they could
fairly and adequately represent the victims of allegedly wrongful
targeted attacks. Furthermore, the expertise that JAG officers can
provide in their representation of victims is unparalleled in the
private sector.
Another alternative is using high-level Government
attorneys, such as Assistant U.S. Attorneys or Federal Defenders.
Using these attorneys would quell some of the concerns regarding
over-militarization. However, using these attorneys would still
require bringing civilians into the review process. It is unlikely that
Government defense officials or members of Congress would
support such a process. The same national security concerns that
keep plaintiffs and their witnesses from being present at FISC
hearings are also present here: civilians should not have access to
classified information. Thus, civilian attorneys should not be
permitted to represent the victims of targeted attacks.
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Nathan Alexander Sales, Self-Restraint and National Security, 6 J.
NATL. SEC. L. & POL’Y 227, 252 (2012).
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D. When A Claim Becomes Actionable
If a “kill list” exists, why is there not a review of that list?
Obviously a large issue in this area of the law is that even if there is a
review of a targeted attack, it may be too little too late if fatalities
have occurred. The assertion that there should be a review of
individuals put on a targeted “kill list” seems only logical from a
human rights perspective.
But again, the TARC is not meant to interfere with military
operations; it is only meant to confirm that Government actions
comply with international and domestic law. While one way to
approach the issue is to review the decision to attack in the first
place, this is likely not a realistic proposition. The need for
immediate action during wartime will likely prevent a review of the
decision to attack prior to the attack occurring. Again, the case law
makes it clear that the Government is given wide latitude from which
to operate and hold its veil of secrecy in the context of combating
terrorism.63 While this may not sit well with many people, it is a line
that United States courts have been very fearful of crossing.
In addition, part of the appeal of post facto review is that
once the alleged threat has been eliminated, the Government’s
national security concern is somewhat diminished. Thus, the
Government will have a harder time arguing that based on the special
63

In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881,
903 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t
of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (permitting
reliance upon secret evidence in designating a group as a terrorist
organization); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333
F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (using classified information in in
camera and ex parte proceedings to prove that a group is a terrorist
organization did not violate due process); Global Relief Found. Inc.
v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (statute not
unconstitutional because it authorizes the use of classified evidence
that may be considered ex parte by the district court).
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circumstances of war it is not able to provide more specific
information regarding each attack.
Furthermore, one must continue to keep United States law
and its procedures in mind. In order for a U.S. court to hear a
challenge to a TARC decision, Article III standing would have to be
established, as it must with every claim brought in federal court. “To
establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”64 And,
“threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in
fact, and that allegations of possible future injury are not
sufficient.”65
The Clapper case, which deals with a FISC decision,
provides a great parallel to a potential TARC case. It is obvious that
there is a significantly different set of concerns when it comes to
placing a wiretap on a person’s communication devices, and placing
someone’s name on a targeted killed list. Although the Clapper case
is not a perfect parallel, the arguments and holdings are quite
comparable. While different standards may be more appropriate
based on the fact that a person’s life is being put in serious jeopardy,
the Article III standards that would allow a case to be brought based
on the fact that a person’s name was placed on a “kill list” have yet
to be articulated in a United States court.66 As a result, it is difficult
to make assumptions about how a United States court would rule on
64

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 U.S. 1138, 1147 (2013)
(emphasis in original).
65
Id.
66
The father of Anwar al-Awlaki brought a comparable suit, but it
was dismissed because the court found that he did not have standing
to assert his son’s constitutional rights. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 14-35 (D.D.C. 2010). However, should an individual
actually be killed by a targeted attack, a family member, on behalf of
the estate, could meet the Article III standing requirement. See AlAulaqi v. Panetta, 2014 WL 1352452 at 10 (D.D.C. April 4, 2014).
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such an issue. Thus, the Clapper case will be used as a comparator
because it provides the most solid legal basis for predicting the
holdings of United States courts on the Article III standing of victims
of targeted attacks.
Clapper involved Section 702 of FISA, which allows the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire
foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing the
surveillance of individuals who are not lawful United States residents
and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.67
The challengers were United States citizens whose work allegedly
involved engaging in international communications with individuals
whom they believed would be potential targets of surveillance under
Section 702 of FISA.68
The Supreme Court denied the citizens’ challenge based on
three key, and relevant, arguments. “First, it is speculative whether
the Government will imminently target communications to which
respondents are parties.”69 Second, even if it could be demonstrated
that the targeting of foreign contacts is imminent, it is mere
speculation that the Government will use FISA authorized
surveillance, rather than other methods, to do so.70 Third, it is unclear
whether the Government would succeed in acquiring the
communications.71
These reasons exemplify why the TARC should not provide
approval, and should merely be used as a system of review: because
any challenges to the decision could not be heard in federal court due
to a lack of standing.
First, just because a person is on a “kill list” does not mean
that an attack is imminent. An attack could occur tomorrow, or ten
67

Clapper, 133 U.S. at 1142.
Id.
69
Id. at 1148.
70
Id. at 1149.
71
Id. at 1150.
68
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years from today, the latter unlikely to be considered imminent.
Second, even if a name was placed on a “kill list”, there is no way to
know whether the Government will use a targeted attack procedure
to complete the operation, or a clearly legal specialized alternative,
such as sending in a SEAL team, the Army Rangers, etc. Finally,
there is no way of knowing whether a targeted attack would be
successful. And without an injury, there is no Article III standing.
Although it seems illogical that placing a person’s name on a
“kill list” should not be subject to judicial review, the claim is likely
to be held to lack Article III standing. As a result, a review of a
TARC decision should only be done after an attack has been
conducted.
If the person attacked is still alive, or if he or she is killed, his
or her family could then fulfill Article III standing requirements for
sustaining an injury.72 It is clear that a targeted attack could be fairly
traceable to the Government and there would be an adequate civil
remedy. Thus, the injury, causation, and redressability prongs would
all be met. The victim or his or her family could then file a claim
with the TARC, and proceedings would commence.
However, there is a problem with this system if the victim is
killed and he or she has no surviving family or friends to bring a
claim. Or, the victim’s family may not know that the victim was
killed in a targeted attack, rather than in a more traditional military
operation. In this case, automatic review of each targeted attack
decision seems more appropriate. While it is impractical based on
time, resources, and the sheer number of attacks, to hold a full
hearing to review each and every targeted attack decision, there is a
middle ground that may be appropriate.
The Government should be required to submit a brief report
of each attack to the TARC. This has a similar deterrent effect as
when law enforcement officers in the U.S. must submit to a review
when they fire their weapon. The report could be brief, but at a
minimum it should establish who was attacked, what their citizenship
72

See Al-Aulaqi, 2014 WL 1352452 at 10.
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status was, why they were attacked, and what was done to confirm
the identity and alleged wrongdoings of the individual.
If the TARC deems that the decision seemed reasonable, they
would do nothing further. However, if the TARC sees flaws in the
report, it could decide to hold a full review hearing. Thus, targeted
attack decisions would be reviewed if: a victim brought a claim;
someone brought a claim on behalf of a victim; or the TARC saw
flaws in the Government’s mandatory report. As a result, all
decisions would be given at least some sort of review. This adds to
the TARC’s goal of deterrence and seems appropriate with human
life at stake.
E. Standard Of Review Used by the TARC
The standard of review for the TARC should be the same as
the standard of review for soldiers in courts-martial: was it justified?
Article 118 of the Manual for Courts-Martial United States defines
murder as the unlawful killing of a human being without justification
or excuse.73
So what is proper justification or excuse? This is where is the
DOJ White Paper once again becomes important. If we assume that
the DOJ correctly analyzes the legality of targeted killings, the
TARC would have to decide if the 3-prong test laid out in the White
Paper had been met.74 There is a one-word addition that should be
included in the test however. This addition would be adding the word
73

R.C.M. § 918. Art. 118.
Isikoff, supra note 31, at 6 of the White Paper (“1) where an
informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined
that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States; 2) where a capture operation would be
infeasible-and where those conducting the operation continue to
monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and 3) where such an
operation would be conducted consistent with applicable law of war
principles.”).
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reasonable into the first prong of this test. So the first factor would
read: “Where an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government
has reasonably determined that the targeted individual poses an
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.”75
If the TARC determines that the Government acted
reasonably in light of the circumstances, the burden would then shift
to the plaintiff to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the attack
was not reasonably justified. This is the standard used in criminal
trials in the United States, as well as for military courts-martials, to
establish guilt.76 Again, the burden would be on the victim, not the
Government, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the threeprong test had not been met. This standard gives the utmost
deference possible to the Government to conduct its wartime
operations, but still ensures some level of accountability. If the
plaintiff established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government
did not act reasonably, he or she would be entitled to damages.
Comparing this standard with the standard of review in
citizen-detainee cases provides support to the constitutionality of this
standard.77 The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution would
not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s
evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and
fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.” 78 Therefore, this
standard seems the most appropriate, as well as the most likely
standard to be approved by the Supreme Court.
F. What Factors the TARC Should Consider

75

Id. (emphasis added).
R.C.M. § 851. Art. 51.
77
This comparison will be analyzed under the CONCERNS
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS section of this
article.
78
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004).
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The factors that the TARC should consider will be largely
determined by the expertise of those who are appointed to review the
targeted attack decisions. These appointees would be best able to
determine whether or not the actions of the Government were
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.
What must be decided is how serious of a threat the
individual allegedly posed, the likelihood that he or she could have
been captured, and whether or not the Government complied with
law of war principles. The DOJ White Paper is again relevant here.
The DOJ White Paper framework provides a solid basis from which
decisions could be reviewed, and it is an appropriate standard for the
TARC to use in its future analysis.
Some of the specific factors the TARC should consider
include: what evidence was gathered; the availability of evidence;
whether more evidence could have been obtained; the reliability of
the evidence that was gathered; and whether that evidence was, or
could have been, corroborated.
More key issues to be decided are: where in the chain of
command the accuracy of the decision-making process began to
breakdown, and how far down, or up, the chain of command fault
should lie? Who gathered evidence, if any? Who is responsible for
poor intelligence and misreported or misinterpreted information?
Should the penalty only be imposed on the final decision-maker or
should his or her subordinates also be punished?
This is one of the points where the limits of lay opinion
become obvious. While it is easy to speculate on what is reasonable
from a computer chair, those with actual experience combating
terrorism will best be able to determine when a decision needed to be
made, what evidence was necessary to make that decision, and who
should be held responsible. This degree of deference places a lot of
faith in those who sit on the TARC. But in light of the fact that it will
be extremely difficult for lay people to adequately answer these
questions, deference to the TARC is the best alternative.
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G. Penalties to be Imposed by the TARC
If the TARC finds that a killing was not justified, what should
happen? First and foremost victims or their families need to be
compensated. A civil penalty should be imposed by the TARC if it
finds that the Government unlawfully conducted a targeted attack
against a U.S. citizen. This provision could be written into the
legislation. If the TARC finds that the Government has unlawfully
attacked a citizen, an automatic payment would be made to the
victim or his or her family. The amount to be paid out for individual
injuries would to be determined by Congress. Victims who are not
killed, but who the TARC determines to have been wrongfully
attacked, would be paid an amount determined by the TARC on a
case-by-case basis. This money would come from an account that the
Government establishes. This requirement should also be mandated
in the legislation.
When it comes to individual decision-makers, the
justifications for imposing a criminal penalty are obvious: the
Government has either just committed murder or attempted murder
of a citizen. The person who ordered that decision committed that
crime. However, putting a person in prison for committing what he
or she believed to be an appropriate action in their duty to protect
American lives seems both controversial, and possibly too extreme.
As a result, criminal penalties should not be imposed by the TARC.
Civil penalties against individual actors would seem more
appropriate. But, it is unlikely that individual Government officials
would have sufficient funds to compensate victims. As a result,
individual Government officials would not be required to pay out
damages; payments would come exclusively from the abovementioned account.79
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This is similar to U.S. employment law where the company pays
for damages arising out of an employee’s mistake during the course
of his or her employment.
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The more appropriate punishment for individual actors would
be demotion or termination from their Government position. Again,
the appropriate punishment would be determined by the TARC.
Termination is obviously a serious penalty, but in light of the
responsibility entrusted to individuals to command United States war
efforts, it may be appropriate. If a Government official makes a
decision to end the life of a United States citizen that the TARC
determines to be unreasonable, there is no reason to continue to trust
that individual to make a similar decision in the future.
Ultimately, the decision of who to punish, and exactly what
sanctions should be imposed should be left to the TARC with great
deference. Congress is in a position to collect data and offer a range
of civil and/or criminal sanctions that the TARC can choose to
impose. Or, Congress can leave the punishment decision up to the
TARC on a case-by-case basis.
H. Appeal Process for TARC Decisions
The appeal process will also mimic the FISA appeal process.
“Congress vested the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review with jurisdiction to review any denials by the FISC of
applications for electronic surveillance.”80 Similarly, Congress can
create a Targeted Attack Review Appeals Court (TARAC) to review
the decisions of the TARC.81
Either those who are sanctioned, or the victims, could appeal
TARC decisions to the TARAC. The TARAC would be staffed by a
similar group of individuals as the TARC. It would have three
members, the same number of individuals as the FISCR.82 It would
80

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 U.S. 1138, 1143 (2013).
As a preliminary matter, the constitutionality of the act that creates
the TARC can be challenged in federal district court. U.S. CONST.,
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
82
United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 103, 119 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied.
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be at the discretion of the TARAC whether to review a TARC
decision. The TARAC would likely be sparingly used, as the FISCR
has only convened twice since its creation.83
The decisions of the TARAC could be appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Congress could give the
district court original jurisdiction over the TARAC under Article
III.84 The court could “review any sealed evidence in camera to
assure” just cause under the applicable standard.85
The D.C. Circuit would decide whether the decision was
made under the appropriate standard, would reverse any decision
made in error, and if necessary would remand for further
proceedings. The appropriate standard of review for the appeal
would be the “some evidence” standard. Although this would not be
an appropriate standard of proof at the trial level, courts, including
the Supreme Court, have utilized the “some evidence” standard in
the past as a standard of review.86 This standard has been primarily
used “by courts examining an administrative record developed after
an adversarial proceeding.”87 Because the TARC would require an
adversarial hearing, this standard is appropriate. As long as there was
“some evidence” that the TARC and TARAC could rely on, their
decisions would be upheld. Again, this gives the utmost deference to
the Government, while still preserving the right to appeal.
Final review would ultimately rest with the Supreme Court of
the United States if it chooses to hear the case, always in camera.
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In re National Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litigation, 671
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VI. Additional Clarifications
A. Concerns Regarding the Right to Due Process
It is important to remember that because the TARC is limited
to reviewing cases of American citizens, due process concerns arise.
As discussed above, the DOJ in its White Paper stated that U.S.
citizenship, the Fourth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause, do
not prevent targeted killings from being lawful acts. 88 Whether
United States courts agree with that sentiment or not has yet to be
clearly decided.
The Supreme Court previously addressed a similar issue. In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held in a plurality decision that
although Congress authorized the indefinite detention of combatants
in limited circumstances, “due process demands that a citizen held in
the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a
neutral decision-maker.”89 This is because even in cases in which the
detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains
the question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who
disputes his enemy-combatant status.90 The plurality went on to hold
that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an
enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s
factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.”91
88

Isikoff, supra note 31, at 2 of the White Paper.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. The Court also states at 528: “this Court
consistently has recognized that an individual challenging his
detention may not be held at the will of the Executive without
recourse to some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to determine
whether the Executive’s asserted justifications for that detention have
basis in fact and warrant in law.”
90
Id. at 524.
91
Id. at 533.
89
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The case law seems to make it clear that as an American
citizen, those subjected to targeted attacks deserve a right to an
impartial hearing. Even though the damage and/or the death may
have occurred, it seems as though ex ante review would not be
possible due to national security concerns, and thus this post facto
review seems to be the only legitimate way to hear the claims of
those who have been targeted.
A court will have to conduct a balancing test for procedural
due process claims.92 Judicial balancing must be done, the alternative
being blind obedience to the Executive branch. Because, “the threats
to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review
are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge
meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial
adjudicator.”93
When it comes to the Government’s efforts to combat
terrorism, courts have consistently rejected defendants’ claims that in
camera and ex parte proceedings violate the defendants’ Fifth
Amendment right to due process.94 “Due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation
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In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881,
903 (9th Cir. 2011).
93
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
94
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d at
903 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t
of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (permitting
reliance upon secret evidence in designating a group as a terrorist
organization); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333
F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (using classified information in in
camera and ex parte proceedings to prove that a group is a terrorist
organization did not violate due process); Global Relief Found. Inc.
v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (statute not
unconstitutional because it authorizes the use of classified evidence
that may be considered ex parte by the district court).
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demands.”95 In National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department
of State, the D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
congressionally approved in camera and ex parte proceedings under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.96
Another U.S. court held that the “notice ‘need not disclose
the classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to
the court under the [relevant statute]. This is within the privilege and
the prerogative of the Executive, and we do not intend to compel a
breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect.’”97 In
light of congressionally and judicially approved in camera and ex
parte proceedings, it is unlikely a court would find this portion of the
TARC legislation unconstitutional.
B. Shifting Control of Targeted Killing Decisions
In March of 2013, President Obama announced that he may
be shifting the targeted killing program from the CIA to the
Department of Defense (DOD). 98 This would actually be a
significant step forward in terms of accountability and legality. The
implementation and procedures of the TARC would not change
95

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
97
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 671
F.3d at 903 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at
208-09); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citing Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) in holding that “the process due in any
given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that
will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s
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however. In fact, TARC review would likely meet much less
opposition and be a more fair proceeding if the DOD authorized the
targeted killing decision instead of the CIA.
First of all, the President would have clear, ultimate authority
over the consequences of targeted killings as Commander-in-Chief.99
Second, the DOD cannot classify all operations as “covert.”100 And
finally, the program would be subject to oversight by other branches
of the government.101 Since the veil of secrecy would be easier to
pull back if the DOD were responsible for the program, the TARC
could come to conclusions based on significantly more information
than it could if the program was still under CIA control. But whether
the CIA or the DOD runs the targeted killing program, the TARC is
still a necessary piece of America’s defense program in the minds of
an ever-increasing number of people, both in the United States and
abroad.
However, Congress has halted this change of control.102 Both
Senate and House appropriators have blocked funding measures
aimed at transferring control of the CIA's stealth drone fleet to the
Pentagon. 103 Some lawmakers, including Senate Intelligence
Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, who was mentioned
previously as a possible supporter of the TARC, have also objected
to the shift of control to the Pentagon based on the CIA’s experience
with using the drone fleet.104
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It is clear that the CIA will retain control of the
Government’s targeted killing decisions for the foreseeable future.
As a result, the creation of the TARC remains a priority in order to
protect both the rights and lives of American citizens across the
globe.
VII. Criticisms of Targeted Attack Review
There are some legitimate critiques of the proposed TARC
process. However, there are compelling concerns that outweigh those
criticisms. The most serious concern is that the creation of a court to
review targeted killing decisions would do more to “normalize” the
targeted killing program than to restrain it.105 It would show the
Government that the American people approve of this extremely
controversial procedure. However, the establishment of the TARC
would not be a recognition by the American people that they approve
of the targeted killing of United States citizens; rather, it is an
acknowledgment of the reality that the Government uses this
procedure and it needs to be regulated. The establishment of the
TARC would be the first step in informing the Government that the
American people do not trust the Government to effectively restrain
itself in times of war one-hundred percent of the time.
Another criticism of creating a targeted killing review court is
that U.S. courts can handle the claims, and thus the creation of a new
court is unnecessary.106 However, on April 4, 2014, Judge Rosemary
Collyer granted a Motion to Dismiss on behalf of the Government in
the District Court for the District of Columbia in a case in which the
ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights represented the
estates of three U.S. citizens whom the CIA and JSOC killed in
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Yemen in 2011.107 In granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
court held that allowing the Plaintiffs to recover “against Defendants
would hinder their ability in the future to act decisively and without
hesitation in defense of U.S. interests.”108 But what is interesting
about the court’s decision is that it never explicitly stated that future
plaintiffs would experience the same result. In fact, the court held
that: “Whether Plaintiffs can claim damages against the United
States is a decision for Congress and the Executive and not
something to be granted by judicial implication.”109 Thus, at least
one court seems to imply that if the TARC were to be created, future
plaintiffs would be able to recover monetary damages if it is deemed
that they are deprived of their due process rights as a result of a
targeted killing.110
Critics of creating a new court believe that a traditional
United States court has many advantages over the kind of review that
would likely take place in a specialized court: the proceedings are
adversarial rather than ex parte, and the hearings are open to the
public.111 The TARC would be an adversarial process, as there would
be a JAG officer representing the plaintiff, but the open proceeding
aspect is where this argument falls apart. This article has discussed at
length the nearly unwavering deference given by courts to allow the
Government significant latitude to claim a need for discretion in
combating terrorism. It is unlikely that a U.S. court would permit
national security secrets to become public during litigation.112
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Another reason that some individuals believe that a separate
court is unnecessary in this context is because federal courts
frequently adjudicate wrongful death claims of citizens killed by law
enforcement agents.113 However, deciding whether a United States
law enforcement official acted appropriately is vastly different from
deciding whether a Government official acted reasonably in his or
her counterterrorism efforts. That determination requires specialized
expertise. While a former federal judge can help decide TARC
claims, those with actual experience fighting terrorism must be
included in the process in order to fairly judge those accused of
acting unreasonably in their efforts to combat terrorism.
Concluding Remarks
The TARC is a necessary component in the Government’s
counterterrorism strategy. It is clear that the TARC is needed in light
of the recent developments in the War on Terror. Most importantly,
this article has shown that the TARC could legally and effectively be
implemented in the United States. This article was written with
practicality in mind, and can hopefully be a blueprint for the creation
of passable legislation by the United States Congress. If nothing else,
it can serve as a springboard for discussion on what can be done to
protect the rights of United States citizens during the continuing War
on Terror. Ironically, the Attorney General perfectly encapsulated the
theme of the TARC in his letter to members of Congress defending
the Administration’s drone policy when he quoted a portion of the
following excerpt from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi:

in public discussion on the use of targeted killing against its citizens,
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113
Jaffer, supra note 105, at 187.

107

CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L.

“We have long since made clear that a state of war is
not a blank check for the President when it comes to
the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”114

114

542 U.S. at 536.

Vol. XIV

